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Abstract 
 Today’s highly vulnerable world information systems are subjected to greater risks than ever 
before. As a result, related officials should be in a position to identify the risks which an organization faces 
and its management policies have to effectively manage those risks. Risk assessment is currently used as 
a key technique for managing security information systems. Literature reveals various information security 
risk assessment methods that can be implemented by the organizations, and each has different 
approaches to assess the information security risks. Organizations find it difficult to select an information 
security risk assessment method. Therefore, there is a need for a critical review of existing risk 
assessment methodologies. This paper presents a brief discussion on the top risk assessment 
methodologies, particularly COBRA, CORAS, CRAMM, OCTAVE, SOMAP, and NIST Guide, along with its 
strengths and weaknesses. After that, a comparative study is also done as the basis of the review results. 
Further research directions may also be taken by the weaknesses section. This work provides an 
evaluation to determine whether an information security risk assessment method is in line with information 
technology governance or not. The research paper will help the senior IT personnel to provide their 
recommendations for using a risk assessment methodology based on the specific requirements of an 
organization. 
 
Keywords: Risk Assessment, Review of Risk Assessment Methodologies, Information Security, 
Comparative Study of Risk Assessment Methodologies. 
  
1. Introduction 
 Todays, business is very depending on the information systems. Computer networks 
have made our life very fast and easy, but along with these facilities, this rises to various threats 
to the information systems. Any information asset, when connected to the outside world, is 
vulnerable to attacks. The attacks are caused by threats which have a potential to exploit 
vulnerabilities. Any type of damage to these assets cause risk and it is one of the most 
important factors for the organization [11] [13]. This shows the requirement of a systematic 
approach to assess information security risks.  
 Over the last couple of years, information security risk assessment has become more 
important for organizations as a result of the release by government and industry governing 
bodies of risk recommendations or requirements [1][2][3]. Other pressures to implement solid 
risk assessment principles are the increase breaches in high-profile information technology (IT) 
and the security requirements of technologically integrated business partners. 
 Formally, risk can be defined as the potential harm caused if a particular threat exploits 
a particular vulnerability to cause damage to an asset, and risk analysis is defined as the 
process of identifying security risks and determining their magnitude and the impact on an 
organization [4] [12]. NIST Guide for Security Certification and Accreditation [5] expands the 
definition to describe the process. Risk assessment include: (i) Identification of threats to and 
vulnerabilities in the system; (ii) Potential impact or magnitude of harm that a loss of CIA 
(Confidentiality, Integrity or Availability) would have on enterprise operations or enterprise 
assets, should an identified vulnerability be exploited by a threat; and (iii) The identification and 
analysis of security controls for the information system.  
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 An important fact in information security is that an asset often ceases to be sensitive or 
critical after a certain period of time i.e. the security requirements of an asset may change with 
time [4]. Manual methods of risk assessment can not be so effective due to increasing 
complexity of possible vulnerabilities and rising threats.  There are so many methodologies and 
tools for risk assessment which available in the literature. Currently, there is not any 
comparative study which shows the strengths and weaknesses of each method that will assist 
organizations in determining which method is the best, in terms of IT governance 
recommendations, to be employed within an organization. This paper is authored to answer 
such type of questions. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief discussion of 
the existing Risk Assessment Methodologies, whereas in Section 3, ‘Strengths and 
Weaknesses’ of each one is discussed. In Section 4, a ‘Comparative Study’ is done on the basis 
of the critical review. Section 5 presents ‘Future Research Directions’ in the area. ‘Conclusion 
and Future Work’ is reported in Section 6. 
 
2.  A Survey of Existing Methodologies 
 Various risk assessment methodologies are reported in the existing literature. Some 
significant contributions bear weight and appear valuable among all. A selection from the trend 
setting research contributions in the concerned area are briefly described one by one for 
analysis of strengths and weaknesses, as follows: 
 
2.1. COBRA 
 COBRA (Consultative, Objective and Bi-functional Risk Analysis), consists of a range of 
risk analysis, consultative and security review tools [6]. These were developed largely in 
recognition of the changing nature of IT and security, and the demands placed by business 
upon these areas.  
 The first, such undercurrent of change, was the growing acceptance that IT security 
was a business issue. It was, and is, becoming largely expected that security reviews should be 
business related, with cost justified solutions and recommendations. Another issue, most of the 
late 90s, is the search by many organizations for a better and more visible return on their 
security budgets. To achieve this, many organizations adopt new approaches to the traditional 
constraints of lack of expertise, time and finance. Oftentimes, a formal risk analysis technique is 
employed. However, conventional methods and tools simply do not address the new demands 
placed by business management. Some go part of the way, but tend to introduce their own 
drawbacks and difficulties. 
 COBRA, and its default methodology, evolved very fast to tackle these issues properly. 
It was developed in full co-operation with one of the world's major financial institutions and 
followed by many years research. It was recognized that business users should be involved 
from the outset. This carries a number of advantages, and shapes the entire review. In addition, 
a number of other radical departures were called for. The result was a risk analysis 
methodology and tool that will meet the most stringent of requirements, fully satisfying the 
changing demands placed upon the security or audit team.  
 The risk assessment process, using COBRA, is extremely flexible. A substantial 
number of approaches are supported. However, the default process usually consists of three 
stages [6]:  
• Questionnaire Building 
• Risk Surveying 
• Report Generation 
  During the first stage, via module selection or generation, the base questionnaire is built 
to fit the environment and requirements of the user. The second stage is the survey process - 
Risk Consultant questions are answered by appropriate personnel and the information is 
securely stored. For the third stage, risk assessments and 'scores' are produced for individual 
risk categories, individual recommendations are made and solutions offered, and potential 
business implications are explained. 
Each of these stages is managed by its corresponding system component: 
Questionnaire Builder, Risk Surveyor and Report Generator. 
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2.2. CORAS 
 CORAS is a European research and technological development project, it is developing 
a tool supported framework for model-based security risk assessment. CORAS provides a 
customized language for threat and risk modeling, and comes with detailed guidelines 
explaining how the language should be used to capture and model relevant information during 
the various stages of the security analysis [7]. In this respect, CORAS is model-based. The 
Unified Modeling Language (UML) is typically used to model the target of the analysis. For 
documenting intermediate results and for presenting the overall conclusions, we use special 
CORAS diagrams which are inspired by UML. The CORAS method provides a computerized 
tool designed to support documenting, maintaining and reporting analysis results through risk 
modeling. In the CORAS method, a security risk analysis is conducted in seven steps which are 
shown in Figure 1 [7]:  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Steps of CORAS Method [7] 
 
• Step 1: The first step involves an introductory meeting. The main item on the agenda for 
this meeting is to get the representatives of the client to present their overall goals of the 
analysis and the target they wish to have analyzed. Hence, during the initial step the 
analysts will gather information based on the client’s presentations and discussions.  
• Step 2: The second step also involves a separate meeting with representatives of the 
client. However, this time the analysts will present their understanding of what they learned 
at the first meeting and from studying documentation that has been made available to them 
by the client. The second step also involves a rough, high-level security analysis. During 
this analysis the first threats, vulnerabilities, threat scenarios and unwanted incidents are 
identified. They will be used to help with directing and scoping the more detailed analysis 
still to come.  
• Step 3: The third step involves a more refined description of the target to be analyzed, and 
also all assumptions and other preconditions being made. Step three is terminated once all 
this documentation has been approved by the client.  
• Step 4: This step is organized as a workshop, drawn from people with expertise on the 
target of the analysis. The goal is to identify as many potential unwanted incidents as 
possible, as well as threats, vulnerabilities and threat scenarios.  
• Step 5: The fifth step is also organized as a workshop. This time with the focus on 
estimating consequences and likelihood values for each of the identified unwanted 
incidents.  
• Step 6: This step gives the client the first overall risk picture. This will typically trigger some 
adjustments and corrections.  
• Step 7: The last step is devoted to treatment identification, as well as addressing 
cost/benefit issues of the treatments. This step is best organized as a workshop.  
 
                     ISSN: 2089-3191 
Buletin TEI  Vol. 1, No. 2,  June 2012 :  111 – 122 
114
2.3. CRAMM 
 CCTA (Central Communication and Telecommunication Agency) Risk Analysis and 
Management Method (CRAMM) includes a comprehensive range of risk assessment tools that 
are fully compliant with ISO 27001and which address tasks such as [8]: 
• asset dependency modeling,  
• business impact assessment,  
• identifying and assessing threats and vulnerabilities,  
• assessing levels of risk, and  
• identifying required and justified controls on the basis of the risk assessment. 
 CRAMM provides a staged and disciplined approach embracing both technical (e.g. IT 
hardware and software) and non-technical (e.g. physical and human) aspects of security. In 
order to assess these components, CRAMM is divided into three stages as shown in Figure 2 
[8]: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Steps of CRAMM Method [8] 
 
(a) Asset identification and valuation: CRAMM enables the reviewer to identify the physical 
(e.g. IT hardware), software (e.g. application packages), data (e.g. the information held on 
the IT system) and location assets that make up the information system. Each of these 
assets can be valued. Physical assets are valued in terms of the replacement cost. Data 
and software assets are valued in terms of the impact that would result if the information 
were to be unavailable, destroyed, disclosed or modified. 
(b) Threat and vulnerability assessment: Having understood the extent of potential 
problems, the next stage is to identify just how likely such problems are to occur. CRAMM 
covers the full range of deliberate and accidental threats that may affect information 
systems including: 
• Hacking  
• Viruses  
• Failures of equipment or software  
• Willful damage or terrorism  
• Errors by people  
This stage concludes by calculating the level of the underlying or actual risk. 
 
(c) Countermeasure selection and recommendation: CRAMM contains a very large 
countermeasure library consists of over 3000 detailed countermeasures organized into 
over 70 logical groupings. The CRAMM software uses the measures of risks determined 
during the previous stage and compares them against the security level (a threshold level 
associated with each countermeasure) in order to identify if the risks are sufficiently great 
to justify the installation of a particular countermeasure. CRAMM provides a series of help 
facilities including backtracking. What If? prioritization functions and reporting tools to 
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assist with the implementation of countermeasures and the active management of the 
identified risks. 
 
2.4. OCTAVE 
 The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) define 
the essential components of a comprehensive, systematic, context-driven information security 
risk evaluation [9]. By following the OCTAVE Method, an organization can make information-
protection decisions based on risks to the CIA of critical information technology assets. The 
operational or business units and the IT department work together to address the information 
security needs of the enterprise.  
 Using a three-phase approach, OCTAVE examines organizational and technology 
issues to assemble a comprehensive picture of the information security needs of the enterprise. 
The Phases of OCTAVE are [9]:  
• Phase 1: Build Asset-Based Threat Profiles: This is an organizational evaluation. Key 
areas of expertise within the organization are examined to identify important information 
assets, the threats to those assets, the security requirements of the assets, what the 
organization is currently doing to protect its information assets (protection strategy 
practices), and weaknesses in organizational policies and practice (organizational 
vulnerabilities).  
• Phase 2: Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities: This is an evaluation of the information 
infrastructure. The key operational components of the information technology infrastructure 
are examined for weaknesses (technology vulnerabilities) that can lead to unauthorized 
action.  
• Phase 3: Develop Security Strategy and Plans: Risks are analyzed in this phase. The 
information generated by the organizational and information infrastructure evaluations 
(Phases 1 and 2) are analyzed to identify risks to the enterprise and to evaluate the risks 
based on their impact to the organization's mission. In addition, a protection strategy for the 
organization and mitigation plans addressing the highest priority risks is developed.  
 Each phase of the OCTAVE method contains two or more processes. The following list 
includes the processes for each phase of OCTAVE [9]:  
• Phase 1: Build Asset-Based Threat Profiles  
o Process 1: Identify Senior Management Knowledge  
o Process 2: Identify Operational Area Knowledge  
o Process 3: Identify Staff Knowledge  
o Process 4: Create Threat Profiles  
• Phase 2: Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities  
o Process 5: Identify Key Components  
o Process 6: Evaluate Selected Components  
• Phase 3: Develop Security Strategy and Plans  
o Process 7: Conduct Risk Analysis  
o Process 8: Develop Protection Strategy  
 
2.5. SOMAP 
 The Security Officers Management and Analysis Project (SOMAP.org) presents Open 
Information Security Risk Assessment Guide which contains detailed information about security 
risk management. The current version of the SOMAP.org Guide describes two methodologies to 
analyze risk: qualitative methodology and quantitative methodology. Depending on the goals, 
which should be achieved when doing the Risk Assessment, the one method is better suited 
than the other. So, the decision, which method to use, should be evaluated in front of the Risk 
Assessment.  
 The Risk Assessment Workflow helps in completing a structured risk assessment and 
analysis. The Workflow leads the security officer through five phases [10]. Every such phase 
consists of multiple activities which sometimes can be done in parallel, sometimes need to be 
done sequentially. The activities are small pieces of work which can either be done by the 
security officer or which can be delegated. Depending on the activity in question, multiple 
persons need to give their input in order to finish an activity. This process consists of the 
following steps [10]: 
• Step 1: Collect data  
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• Step 2: Threat Analysis 
• Step 3: Vulnerability Analysis 
• Step 4: Risk Retention 
• Step 5: Risk Treatment 
 In the step 4, there are four sub activities: Risk Identification, Risk Estimation, Risk 
Evaluation, and Risk Financing. Further, Risk Estimation can be done by both qualitatively way 
and quantitatively way. There are some risk calculation formulas for both the methods. 
 
2.6. NIST Guide 
 Risk is the net negative impact of the exercise of vulnerability, considering both the 
probability and the impact of occurrence [5]. Risk management is the process of identifying risk, 
assessing risk, and taking steps to reduce risk to an acceptable level. NIST (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology) guide provides a foundation for the development of an effective risk 
management program, containing both the definitions and the practical guidance necessary for 
assessing and mitigating risks identified within IT systems [5]. The ultimate goal is to help 
organizations to better manage IT-related mission risks [5]. 
Risk assessment is the first process in the risk management methodology. 
Organizations use risk assessment to determine the extent of the potential threat and the risk 
associated with an IT system throughout its SDLC. The output of this process helps to identify 
appropriate controls for reducing or eliminating risk during the risk mitigation process.  
 Risk is a function of the likelihood of a given threat-source’s exercising a particular 
potential vulnerability, and the resulting impact of that adverse event on the organization [5]. 
The risk assessment methodology encompasses nine primary steps (as shown in Figure 3), 
which are given as follows: 
• Step 1: System Characterization  
• Step 2: Threat Identification  
• Step 3: Vulnerability Identification  
• Step 4: Control Analysis  
• Step 5: Likelihood Determination  
• Step 6: Impact Analysis  
• Step 7: Risk Determination  
• Step 8: Control Recommendations  
• Step 9: Results Documentation  
 Steps 2, 3, 4, and 6 can be conducted in parallel after Step 1 has been completed.  
 
 
3. Strengths and Weaknesses 
 After a critical review of mentioned risk assessment methodologies above, we have 
noted some strengths and weaknesses of each one, which are given in the different sub-
sections. 
 
3.1. COBRA  
 After going through this methodology, we listed some strengths and weaknesses, which 
are given as follows: 
 
(a) Strength(s):   
The major strengths of this Risk Assessment methodology are as follows [6]: 
• COBRA provides a variety of tools for risk assessment, which means most of the 
processes are automated. This makes the risk assessment process very easy. 
• The methodology has very simple steps and hence this is very easy for implementation 
perspective.  
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Figure 3. Risk Assessment Methodology Flowchart [5] 
 
 
(b) Weaknesses: 
The major weaknesses of this Risk Assessment methodology are as follows [6]: 
• This methodology is based on the various questionnaire or survey i.e. opinion based; the 
participants may or may not be well aware with the recent developments in the concerned 
area. Hence, there is a need to quantify a maximum number of steps. 
• This methodology is a generalized one; hence, there is still a need to develop or extend the 
methodology for particularly requirements phase. 
• What is the accuracy level of this methodology is also not mentioned. Therefore, one may 
validate this methodology and discuss the results by applying the same. 
• Risk assessment technique is not clearly mentioned; hence, there is need to extend this 
methodology in this direction. 
• COBRA does not clearly talk about the security attributes e.g. Confidentiality, Integrity, and 
Availability etc [4]. Hence, this point can also be taken into consideration. 
• Threats and vulnerabilities play a very important role in the process of risk assessment; but 
how these are taken into consideration, is not clearly given in the methodology. Hence, 
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further work may be done in this direction to increase the useability and accuracy of 
COBRA. 
 
3.2. CORAS 
 After going through this methodology, we listed some strengths and weaknesses, which 
are given as follows: 
(a) Strength(s):   
The major strengths of this Risk Assessment methodology are as follows [7]: 
• This methodology for model-based risk assessment (MBRA) integrating aspects from partly 
complementary risk assessment methods and state-of-the-art modeling methodology 
applies the standardized modeling technique UML to form input models to risk analysis 
methods that are used in a risk management. 
• A UML based specification language targeting security risk assessment is used in the 
CORAS, which increases its applicability. 
• There are so many automated procedures which also increases its uses. 
• This is very useful for Object Oriented Projects. 
(b) Weaknesses: 
The major weaknesses of this Risk Assessment methodology are as follows [7]: 
• This methodology is a generalized one; hence, there is still a need to develop or extend the 
methodology for particularly requirements phase. 
• The methodology is much opinion based; the participants of the meeting or workshop may 
or may not be well aware with the recent developments in the concerned area. Hence, 
there is a need to quantify a maximum number of steps. 
• What is the accuracy level of this methodology is also not mentioned. Therefore, one may 
validate this methodology and discuss the results by applying the same. 
• CORAS does not clearly talk about the security attributes e.g. Confidentiality, Integrity, and 
Availability etc [4]. Hence, this can also be taken into consideration. 
• ‘How the severity of threats and vulnerabilities is mapped’, is not clearly given in CORAS. 
Hence, there is a need to re-look in this perspective. 
• Quantitatively risk assessment can not be provided by CORAS. Hence, there need to 
extend this methodology in this direction. 
 
3.3. CRAMM 
 After going through this framework, we listed some strengths and weaknesses, which 
are given as follows: 
(a) Strength(s):   
The major strengths of this Risk Assessment methodology are as follows [8]: 
• CRAMM provides a variety of tools for risk assessment, which means most of the 
processes are automated. This makes the risk assessment process very easy. 
• This methodology is fully compliant with ISO 27001, which also increases its applicability. 
 
(b) Weaknesses: 
The major weaknesses of this Risk Assessment methodology are as follows [8]: 
• This methodology is a generalized one; hence, there is still a need to develop or extend the 
methodology for particularly requirements phase. 
• Quantitatively risk assessment can not be provided by CRAMM. Hence, there is need to 
extend this methodology in this direction. 
• For list of vulnerabilities, source is not clearly mentioned. Hence, some work may be done 
for identifying the source and also for ensuring the update of this list of vulnerabilities. 
• CRAMM does not clearly talk about the security attributes e.g. Confidentiality, Integrity, and 
Availability etc [4]. Hence, this can also be taken into consideration. 
• ‘How the severity of threats and vulnerabilities is mapped’, is not clearly given in CRAMM. 
Hence, there is a need to re-look in this perspective. 
 
3.4. OCTAVE 
 After going through this guide, we listed some strengths and weaknesses, which are 
given as follows: 
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(a) Strength(s):   
The major strengths of this Risk Assessment methodology are as follows [9]: 
• In this methodology, all the operational critical threats, assets, and vulnerabilities are taken 
into consideration; this increases the accuracy of the risk assessment. 
• The methodology not only provides risk assessment value, but it also provides some 
security strategy and plans which increases the applicability of the process. 
(b) Weaknesses: 
The major weaknesses of this Risk Assessment methodology are as follows [9]: 
• Risk evaluation criteria are based on a qualitative scale (high, medium, low); hence, further 
work may include its extension for quantitative scales also. 
• This methodology is a generalized one; hence, there is still a need to develop or extend the 
methodology for particularly requirements phase. 
• The methodology considers only three attributes for risk assessment: Confidentiality, 
Integrity, and Availability. There are some other attributes like Authenticity, Non-repudiation 
[4], Accountability, and Auditability [10] which may also be taken into this list for risk 
calculation factors. This will improve the accuracy of the risk assessment. 
• What is the accuracy level of this methodology is also not mentioned. Therefore, one may 
validate this methodology and discuss the results by applying the same. 
• The methodology is much opinion based; the participants of the workshop may or may not 
be well aware with the recent developments in the concerned area. Hence, there is a need 
to quantify a maximum no. of steps. 
 
3.5. SOMAP 
 After going through this guide, we listed some strengths and weaknesses, which are 
given as follows: 
(a) Strength(s):   
The major strengths of this Risk Assessment methodology are as follows [10]: 
• The proposed methodology describes both the methods for risk assessment, qualitative, 
and quantitative. Users of this methodology can use any one depending upon the type of 
project. 
• The methodology has a factor ‘Control Effectiveness’ that means ‘how effective a Control 
when it is implemented’. Any control may have different effectiveness for different type of 
projects.  This factor increases the accuracy level of the methodology.  
(b) Weaknesses: 
The major weaknesses of this Risk Assessment methodology are as follows [10]: 
• This methodology is a generalized one; hence, there is still a need to develop or extend the 
methodology for particularly requirements phase. 
• The methodology considers five key attributes for risk assessment: Confidentiality, 
Integrity, Availability, Accountability, and Auditability. There are some other attributes like 
authenticity, non-repudiation [4] which may also be taken into this list for risk calculation 
factors. This will improve the accuracy of the risk assessment. 
• The method talks about the ‘Cost of Control’; but this is not mentioned that how this factor 
will be calculated. Hence, there is a need to describe the same in detail. 
• On which basis, all the ranks or values of components are defined, is not mentioned in the 
report. Hence, there is a need to clearly mention the base in this formula. 
• What is the accuracy level of this methodology is also not mentioned. Therefore, one may 
validate this methodology and discuss the results by applying the same. 
• Threats and vulnerabilities play a very important role in risk assessment process. Although 
the method considers both the things in the beginning, but in the calculation part, only 
likelihood and impact of vulnerabilities are taken into consideration. Hence, threat related 
values may also be incorporated in the formula to increase the accuracy level. 
 
3.6. NIST Guide 
 After going through this guide, we listed some strengths and weaknesses, which are 
given as follows: 
(a) Strength(s):   
The major strengths of this Risk Assessment methodology are as follows: 
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• This guide highly recommends the integration of risk assessment into SDLC [5]. Risk 
assessment is an iterative process that can be performed during each major phases of 
SDLC. This indicates that risk assessment process must be embedded in the early phases 
of SDLC i.e. Requirements phase itself. 
• The methodology has very simple steps and hence this is very easy for implementation 
perspective.  
• The methodology uses a step ‘Control Analysis’, in which existing control analysis is done 
in various detailed steps, which improves the accuracy of methodology. 
(b) Weaknesses: 
The major weaknesses of this Risk Assessment methodology are as follows [5]: 
• This methodology is a generalized one i.e. for all the major phases of SDLC; hence, there 
is still a need to develop or extend the methodology for particularly requirements phase. 
• The likelihood of the vulnerabilities is described as high, medium, or low; but at what basis, 
these levels are allocated, is not clearly mentioned in the report. Hence, this step may be 
revisited.  
• For threat sources, all types of threats are taken into consideration. But from security 
perspective, some threats like natural threats e.g. floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, 
landslides etc. are not much relevant. Hence, this step also requires reconsideration with 
security points of view. 
• For list of vulnerabilities, source is not clearly mentioned. Hence, some work may be done 
for identifying the source and also for ensuring the update of the list of vulnerabilities. 
• This methodology does not talk about the quantification of the risk. Although some 
calculation is done, but it is not the accurate; because the values of high, medium, and low 
impact is fixed as 100, 50, and 10. Therefore, further research is required to quantify the 
entire calculation. 
• In the step 3 of the report i.e. Vulnerability Identification, there is a step System Security 
Testing which can not be followed at the requirements level. Hence, for requirements level 
risk assessment, the methodology may be revisited. 
• Impact analysis is performed on the basis of three attributes: confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. There are some other attributes like authenticity, non-repudiation [4] [10] which 
may also be taken into this list for performing impact analysis. This will improve the 
accuracy level of the risk assessment. 
 
 
4. Comparative Study 
 For accomplishing a comparative study of the aforementioned methodologies, some 
attributes have been identified based on the well known practices with similar cases. These are 
described as follows: 
• Quantification: For the accuracy of the results, quantification of any process is highly 
required.  Most of the methodologies provide various mathematical formulas for assessing 
the correct value [14]. Moreover, quantification increases the reliability of the process. 
• Integration of Security Attributes: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability are the basic 
pillars of information security. Preservation of these attributes must be considered in any 
process [16]. 
• Integration of Threats and Vulnerabilities: Vulnerabilities are the weaknesses of the 
software, which causes threats. There are various databases worldwide, which maintain 
the list of these vulnerabilities in details along with their countermeasures. Therefore, it is 
highly desirable to address the same. 
• Requirements Phase Perspective: Requirements phase is the backbone of any software 
to be developed [15]. As it is already discussed that this phase must be considered very 
seriously, it is necessary for any methodology to consider this perspective. 
• Accuracy level/ Validation: Any methodology is only useful when it is well supported by 
the tryouts of a large sample of live projects. Therefore, this attributes is also desired. 
• Standard Compliance: If any methodology is relevant standard compliance, it increases 
the trust level. Therefore, suitable standards’ compliance must be achieved to extend the 
level of useability. 
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• Supporting Tools: Automation of any process makes the steps easier; therefore, tools 
support is highly recommended. 
 On the basis of these review results i.e. strengths and weaknesses, a comparative 
study of the mentioned methodologies above is done. A table is made for the comparative study 
at- a-glance. If the methodology fully satisfies an attribute, a mark √ is drawn against the 
column, otherwise × is marked. 
 
 
Table 1. Comparison of risk assessment methodologies 
Attribute COBRA CORAS CRAMM OCTAVE SOMAP NIST Guide 
Quantification  × × × × √ × 
Integration of 
Security 
attributes 
× × × × × × 
Integration of 
Threats and 
vulnerabilities 
× √ √ √ × √ 
Requirements 
phase 
perspective 
× × × × × × 
Accuracy level/ 
Validation  
× × √ × × × 
Standard 
compliance 
× × √ × × × 
Supporting 
Tools 
√ √ √ × × × 
 
5. Future Research Directions 
 Based on this critical review, strengths, and weaknesses of existing risk assessment 
methodologies, we have collected some future research directions which are given as follows: 
• In COBRA, further research may be done for the quantification of the risk assessment, 
addition of CIA, threats and vulnerabilities in the process, making the methodology more 
specific for requirements phase, along with a validation report. 
• In case of CORAS, future work may include the inclusion of CIA, quantification of the risk 
value, consideration of threats and vulnerabilities in the process, extension with 
requirements phase perspective, validation and presentation for a live project. 
• Future research in CRAMM may include throwing light on the mapping of threats and 
vulnerabilities, quantification of risk value, inclusion of CIA, making more useful for 
conceptual phases of SDLC e.g. requirements phase.  
• In OCTAVE, further research may be undertaken for the quantification of steps, inclusion of 
other attributes like Authenticity, Non-repudiation, Accountability, and Auditability, making 
the process more specific for requirements phase, along with a validation report. 
• Further work may be done in SOMAP for throwing light on ‘cost of control’ and the base of 
the ranks or values of components, inclusion of other attributes like authenticity, non-
repudiation, incorporating threat related values in the formula, making the methodology 
more specific for requirements phase, along with a validation report. 
• In case of NIST guide, future research may be done for throwing the light on the likelihood 
of the vulnerabilities, base of the levels of vulnerabilities, inclusion of other security 
attributes, like authenticity, non-repudiation, making the process more specific for 
requirements perspective. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion  
The paper presented a comparative study, strengths and weaknesses of the existing 
risk assessment methodologies along with the future research directions. Decision making for 
selecting a risk assessment methodology can be easily done by the Senior IT Personnel by 
going through the results, derived in the paper. Research community has made significant 
progress along with many fronts in the area of risk assessment. At the same time, the demands 
placed on computing and the cyber infrastructure has increased dramatically, raising many new 
critical research questions. Keeping in view, we presented a number of research areas in which 
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further work is required, based on the existing or published work. The major need is to make all 
the methodologies more specific for the requirements phase because requirements are 
considered as foundation stone on which the entire software can be built and the requirements 
phase is the foremost opportunity for the product team to consider how security will be 
integrated into a development process. This work may help to provide effective and efficient 
ways to incorporate security right from the beginning in the development life cycle. Possible 
future extension of the work has already been discussed exhaustively in the section above. 
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